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BAR BRIEFS
TAXATION-TAx TITLES-IMPROPER NOTICE OF EXPIRATION OF PERIOD
OF REDEMPTION UNDER NORTH DAKOTA LAW. In the notice of the expira-
tion of the period of redemption to the former owner of land sold for
delinquent taxes, the county auditor included all property taxes plus hail
tax assessments levied against the land up to the time of the notice, as a
pre-requisite for redemption, whereas only the amount of taxes plus interest
and penalty at the time when the land was sold should have been stated.
An action to quiet title brought by the former owner for the benefit of his
grantee was unsuccessful in the district court, and on appeal to the supreme
court it was held, that the judgment be reversed. The inclusion of such
amounts in the notice of the expiration of the period for redemption vitiated
the notice, and the tax deed subsequently issued thereon to the county was
void, so that a purchaser from the delinquent taxpayer will prevail over
the holder of the county deed. Morehouse v. Paulsen, 28 N. W. 2d 608 (N.
D. 1947).
That tax redemption statutes will be strictly construed in the interest
of the redemptioner has so definitely been determined it no longer remains
a matter of issue. Baeverstad v. Reynolds, 73, N. D. 603, 18 N.W. 2d 20, 21
(1945) ; Trustee Loan Co. v. Millie Botz, 37 N. D. 230, 164 N.W. 14 (1917) ;
Martin v. Barbour, 140 U. S. 634, 35 L. Ed. 546, 11 S. Ct. 944 (1891). The
reason for the development of this rule is well expressed in 2 Blackwell, Tax
Titles, sec. 728 (2d ed. 1898) in which is stated, ". . . the sale of land for
taxes is the nearest approach to tyranny that exists in a free government."
It must be borne in mind that tax titles are largely governed by the statutes
of the several states. The complaint in the case under discussion was not
filed in district court until July 17, 1946, approximately five years after
the deed was issued to the county. Certain limitation and curative statutes
such as N. D. Rev. Code (1943) sec. 57-4511 and sec. 57-2429 have a marked
effect upon whether a defect in the notice of expiration of redemption will
be fatal to the tax deed. A tax deed void by reason of some jurisdictional
defect cannot become valid by mere lapse of time. Roberts v. First Nat.
Bank, 8 N. D. 504, 79 N. W. 1049 (1899) ; Sweigle v. Gates, 9 N. D. 538, 84
N.W. 481 (1900); Power v. Kitching, 10 N. D. 260, 86 N.W. 737, 88 Am. St.
Rep. 691 (1901). The word jurisdictional is not used here in its usual
form as pertaining to the power of a court to hear, determine, and enforce
a judgment rendering on such hearing. The exact legal significance of the
word varies with the circumstances under which it is used, and jurisdictional
defect here means the nonperformance of an act by an official of the county
in tax sale proceedings which is inherently necessary :under due process.
The three year limitation of action against tax deeds provided for in N. D.
Rev. Code (1943) sec. 57-4511 should have been invoked, therefore, unless
the tax deed in this case was void by reason of jurisdictional defects. It
has been held that if the required notice of the expiration of the time of
redemption was never given, the statute of limitations will not perfect the
deed; but, if the notice was in fact given, though the proof thereon made
and filed with the treasurer was defective in some particular capable of
being cured by amendment, then the statute will apply. Slyfield v. Healy, 32
F. 2 (1886) ; Saranac Land and Timber Co. v. Roberts, 177 U. 5. 318, 20 S.
Ct. 642, 44 L. Ed. 786 (1900). In this state the test as to what constitutes
a jurisdictional defect was laid down in the case of Nind v. Meyers, 15 N.
D. 400, 109 N.W. 335 (1906). There the court said, "The jurisdictional de-
fects, which cannot be thus barred without adverse possession consist of the
nonperformance of some of those things which are inherently or consitu-
tionally necessary to the sale. The nonperformance of some act which is not
inherently or constitutionally necessary to the right to sell, but which the
legislature in its discretion may or may not require, is not a jurisdictional
defect as that term is used in construing and applying statutes like sec.
57-4511." But Cf. Eaton v. Bennett, 10 N. D. 346, 87 N.W. 188 (1901); ex-
pressly overruled in State Finance Co. v. Mather, 15 N. D. 386, 109 N.W.
350 (1906). In Monroe v. Donovan, 31 N. D. 228, 235, 153 N. W. 461
(1915), although not deciding that precise issue the opinion stated that the
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legislature might have, had it desired, omitted any provision for notice of
the expiration of the time of redemption, since that was not a constitutional
requirement under due process, and it is uniformly held that the legislature
has power by a subsequent statute to cure irregularities in tax proceedings,
the necessity of which might have been dispensed with or declared im-
material by prior statute. Saranac Land and Timber Co. v. Roberts, 177 U.
S. 318, 20 S. Ct. 642, 44 L. Ed. 786 (1900); Shattuck v. Smith, 6 N. D. 56,
69 N.W. 5 (1896); Never v. Cornwall, 10 N. D. 123, 86 N.W. 227 (1901);
Wells Co. v. McHenry, 7 N. D. 256, 74 N.W. 241 (1898). From what has
been stated above, it seems that the defect attacked in the case under dis-
cussion was not a jurisdictional one, since if the legislature may dispense
with the notice of expiration of the period of redemption entirely, then under
the test laid down in Nind v. Meyers, 15 N. D. 400, 109 N.W. 335 (1906), it
would seem that an error in the notice of expiration of the period of redemp-
tion would not be such a jurisdictional defect as is normally necessary to
cause the limitation statute to be inoperative. However, in two compara-
tively recent cases, Fish v. France, 71 N. D. 499, 2 N. W. 2d 537 (1942) and
Hodges v. McCutcheon, 72 N. D. 150, 5 N.W. 2d 83 (1942), which are very
similar to the case under discussion here, except that the notice of expira-
tion of the period of redemption included taxes prior to the taxes for which
the property was sold at the tax sale, instead of subsequent as in the present
case, the court held that such a defect would not start the statute running.
Upon petition for rehearing the court in the McCutcheon Case expressly
stated that such a defect which vitiates the notice of expiration of redemp-
tion is a jurisdictional defect, and thus left no doubt as to the law in this
state.
RAY R. FRIEDERICH
Second Year Law Student
TORTS-BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS
DEFENSE. Plaintiff's husband died of burns received from explosion of
gasoline and kerosene mixture sold in violation of a statute enacted for the
protection of the public and describing certain precautions to be used in
handling and labeling volatile oils distilled from petroleum. In an action
by plaintiff for damages for death, the trial court directed a verdict for
the defendant oil company. On appeal to the supreme court it was held,
that the judgment be reversed and a new trial granted. Contributory neg-
ligence is available as a defense even though defendant violated a statute.
Plaintiff is entitled to new trial of issues raised in view of courts state-
ment of the law on this point. Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 27 N.W. 2d 555 (Minn.
1947).
Broadly speaking, whether contributory negligence is a defense to a
statutory tort depends upon the intent of the legislature in enacting the
statute; those statutes not permitting the defense are based either upon the
principle that certain classes of people are protected because of their in-
ability to protect themselves, Restatement Torts, § 483 (1934), or upon
other grounds of public policy. In the first classification are included child
labor acts, Dusha v. Virginia & Rainy Lake Co., 145 Minn. 171, 176 N.W.
482, 23 A.L.R. 632 (1920); statutes protecting intoxicated persons, Mayes
v. Byers, 214 Minn. 54, 7 N.W. 2d 403, 144 A.L.R. 821 (1943); Hauth v.
Sambo, 100 Neb. 160, 158 N.W. 1036 (1916) ; and statutes forbidding sale of
dangerous articles to minors, Pizzo v. Wiemann, 149 Wis. 235, 134 N.W.
899, 38 A.L.R. (N.S.) 678, Ann. Cas. 1913C 803 (1912). Those instances
forbidding the defense upon other grounds of public policy include willful
violation of safety statutes for protection of employees, Western Anthracite
Coal and Coke Co. v. Beaver, 192 Ill. 333, 61 N.E. 335 (1901); Chicago-
Joulterville Coal Co. v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 130 F. 957
(C.C.W.D. Mo. 1904) ; absolute liability of railroads for fires set by its loco-
motives, Mathews v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 142 Mo. 645, 44 S.W. 802
(1897) ; absolute liability of railroads for failure to build fences or erect
